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Q: Your work and interests in linguistics have been very varied, and they have 
touched upon many dzfferent areas, couldyou te11 us a little bit about the develop- 
ment ofyour research interests in linguistics? 
N.S: It started when 1 was a student at Cambridge and 1 was bored with 
modern languages, which was mainly romance philology and the history of 
German literature before 1500. So 1 did a paper in linguistics and got hooked 
on traditional (pre-Chomskyan) linguistics so hooked that 1 then came to 
London to do a PhD. 1 was caught by the idea of doing field work on an 
unwritten language so 1 read books on anthropology ti11 1 found a nice one, 
namely the Nupe in Nigeria. Then 1 hitch-hiked out to Nigeria and spent a 
year sitting in a mud hut working on the language. And then 1 wrote out my 
thesis which was a grammar of Nupe. Although it was on Nupe it was a thesis 
in general linguistics, influenced mainly by Michael Halliday and his work - 
Halliday was in London at that time. As a result of that, 1 was given a job at 
the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), where 1 was converted to 
generative grammar by one of my colleagues in the Department of Indian 
Studies. As a result of that 1 decided to go to MIT and spend a couple of years 
there, from 1966 to 1968, with the idea of working on generative grammar of 
West African languages. In particular, 1 wanted to look at the syntax of Ewe, 
but when 1 got there Chomsky was on sabbatical and 1 was adopted by Morris 
Halle, who was very kind to me and inspired me with an interest in phonology 
which 1 had not had before, at least generative phonology. As a result of that, 
1 spent most of my time at MIT, at least for the first half, working on phonology. 
Then Chomsky came back and 1 worked on syntax. 1 also spent some time in 
California (at UCLA) working on African languages and linguistics, but my 
first really decent work as opposed to the dabblings in West African languages 
arose from that, because while 1 was in the States my first son was born and 1 
started work on language acquisition in about 1968, when he started to speak. 
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Because 1 had spent so much time working on phonology it turned out to be 
a book on the acquisition of phonology rather than the acquisition of syntax. 
It was as a result of Halle's influence and the fact that 1 had been able to work 
at MIT that 1 could do that. 
But 1 was only there for two years and when 1 got back 1 was working mainly 
on syntax and general theory, but 1 was doing research on phonology. And that 
left me interested in phonology for many years. It was probably another ten 
years before 1 gave up phonology and 1 haven't done much in that since. After 
that I suppose it was a continuation of my conversion to theory. When 1 started 
as a student 1 was only interested in facts, and description, and it was really at 
MIT that 1 began to be interested in explanations and theory. That developed 
with my work on the acquisition of phonology, and was encouraged when 1 
got back mainly by Deirdre Wilson with whom 1 worked very closely. We wrote 
a book togetherland that and other things 1 did on the philosophy of language 
was a development from description to explanation. 
Q: Wbat didyou JZnd in tbeo y that was more motivating than continuing with 
description? 
N.S.: 1 suppose the real reason was that every time you describe something 
you just add another little pebble on top of your heap, following the old 
fashioned idea that science is cumulative; you add a brick to the wall, everything 
is factual and so on. 1 think the problem with that view is extremely well- 
expressed by Popper in his Conjectures and Refitations: in order to be intellec- 
tually honest and in order to be able to make a serious contribution, you need 
to state the conditions under which you will give up your beliefs rather than 
simply add to them. That's a position that later became known as naive 
falsificationism, but for a long time 1 found it very appealing and 1 decided 
that, although 1 was quite good at manipulating data, it wasn't really the 
description that turned me on as much as what might consitute an explanation. 
It gradually dawned on me, much later than it should on most people and much 
later than it does on students these days, that if one wants an explanation one 
has to have a theory. And the only coherent theory that 1 came across was 
Chomskyan in one sense or another. At the same time, 1 got interested in 
pragmatics because of Deirdre Wilson and her work with Dan Sperber2. So, 1 
set up a conference on mutual knowledge that resulted in a book that 1 edited, 
which sort of generalized my interest away from core linguistics to problems 
of communication. Again the idea was to see how on earth one could explain 
how communication took place. Although the book was called Mutual Know- 
1. Srnith, Neil and Deirdre Wilson. 1979. Modern Ltnguwtrcs. The Results of Chomsky? Revolut2on. 
London: Pcnguin. 
2. Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wison. 1986. Releuance. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
- 
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ledge, there wasn't really a consensus view but the conclusion 1 drew from it was 
that mutual knowledge was a waste of time. 
Q: What does mutual knowledge standfor? 
N. S. : "Mutual knowledge" was a locution devised by Schiffer in the 1960's 
and the idea was that in order to communicate successfully you needed to 
establish mutual knowledge between speaker and hearer. Sperber and Wilson 
have essentially demolished that position and replaced it by a situation in which 
you optimize relevance rather than dealing in terms of knowledge which 
presupposes factuality or truth, and factuality is not necessarily important. That 
again was a diversification into greater interest in theory. And 1 suppose al1 the 
time what 1 try to do is unite as many different strands in linguistics as 1 can, 
so that 1 have an overall conspectus of the discipline, which includes phonology, 
syntax, and a little bit of semantics and pragmatics, as well as detailed analyses 
of any one part of it. 1 have always been a jack of al1 trades and tried to get my 
fingers into as many pies as possible and draw everything together, so that there 
is an overall theory that will account for everything that is going on. 
Q: You've mentioned so many dzfferent areas in the answer to thejrst question 
that Iguess I will now ask you to expand on some of the dzfferent things thatyou've 
talked about. One of thejrst things you've mentioned is language acquisition and 
howyou became interested in it. What is thepresentstate ofjrst language acquisition 
studies and what has been achieved? 
N.S.: It's sort of fun at the moment because so much seems to be going on 
simultaneously. There's Radford's recent book3 and that work has been influen- 
tial, but 1 think the real turning point came with the arrival of the principies 
andparameters framework4 at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s 
in Chomsky's theory where at last it began to seem possible to provide some 
sort of explanation of how it was that children could learn their first language. 
In Chomsky's early work he had postulated a language acquisition device which 
presupposed some kind of evaluation measure. There were al1 sorts ofproblems 
with the evaluation measure: how on earth the child could choose among 
competing descriptively adequate grammars, and if you had a descriptively 
adequate grammar why would you want to go and look at seventy more of 
them and then start choosing between them by whatever kind of metric. The 
details of the metric were never particularly well worked out, anyway. 
3. Radford, Andrew. 1770. Syntactic Tbeory and tbe Acquisition of Englisb Syntax. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell.See the review section of this issue for a review of this book. 
4. See the review section in this issue. The following books reviewed there are within this framework: 
Ouhalla (1771), Radford (1770), Botha (1787), Speas. 
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The developments in the principles and parameters framework seemed to 
reiterate the kind of work in biology especially in immunology. It is described 
quite nicely in an article by Piattelli- Palmarini5 where he describes how work 
in immunology underwent a change from being what one might cal1 instructive 
to being selective. That is, it used to be believed that the system had to be 
instructed by impinging external stimuli in order to react appropriately and 
develop the correct kind of antigen. Then gradually al1 those theories were 
replaced by a selective theory that presupposed that the organism had available 
right from the beginning al1 conceivable antigens and therefore al1 it had to do 
when some external stimulus impinged was select the correct antidote from an 
antecedently available reservoir. If you think about it, that is exactly similar to 
what happened with having an evaluation measure where you had to generate 
a particular reponse to the incoming stimuli, where you constructed a grammar 
and then when you got lots of them you chose among them. In principles and 
parameters you dont really have to go through that procedure, there are no 
rules of grammar anymore, what you have is universal principles, a number of 
which are parametrized and, of course, you have lexical entries, and opinions 
differ as to where the parametrization lies. In the case of language then what 
happens is that the child selects from an antecedently available set of grammars 
the actual grammar that he happens to be exposed to. That is an interesting 
transition in that it now makes it feasible to acquire language if there is 
essentially one supergrammar specified by Universal Grammar (UG) and the 
idiosyncratic differences across languages can then be selected from that 
available set perfectly straightforwardly. 1 think that development especially in 
syntax and gradually in phonology has had a beneficial influence on language 
acquisition research because people can begin to see how they can answer the 
questions as to how children can possibly solve particular problems - of negative 
data, problems of retreat, problems of tadpoles becoming frogs and so on. 1 
think Chomsky's influence in that respect has been for the second time 
extremely beneficial to language acquisition research. 
Q: Could we say that it has given it a methodology? 
N.S.: Right, it's given it a methodology and it's given it a framework which 
makes it look like a feasible enterprise rather than a miracle. In some of his 
earlier work, Chomsky drew the distinction benveen problems and myste- 
ries. Problems were those things which one might rationally address and solve. 
Mysteries were really fascinating but phenomena which one had really no hope 
ever of understanding, for instance, the mystery of free will. 1 think the 
principles and parameters framework has probably made language acquisition 
5. Piattelli-Palmarini, M. 1989. "Evolution, Selection and Cognition: from "Learning" to Parameter- 
Setting in Biology and in the Study of Language". Cognition 31. 1-44. 
-- 
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study change from being some kind of mystery to being a problem that one 
might conceivably solve. And both in syntax and phonology there is a huge 
amount of work now attempting to put into practice the program that 
Chomsky devised in the late 1970s and early 1980s. There are further - maybe 
more technical, but quite fascinating - developments in first language acquisi- 
tion arising from the details of syntactic theory. In particular, if you think of 
what's happened in post-Barriers work where X-bar syntax has been generalized 
to functional categories. Radford's work and a lot of other work has concentra- 
ted on the development of functional categories and there's the interesting 
hypothesis that what characterizes children's speech is the absence of functional 
categories, and that simple claim, given that we now have a suitably complex 
and well articulated theory of what the functional categories are and how they 
might even constitute some sort of natural class, makes empirical predictions 
across a huge range of constructions. For instance, if there are no functional 
categories and if functional categories are responsible for things like directio- 
nality constraints then it would follow that little children have no directionality 
consiraints and they ought to have basically freer word order. Now, again and 
again one looks at child language data and one sees that there is much more 
free word order than there is in the adult language - unless, of course the adult 
language has totally free word order. But if you look at French and English and 
Spanish and Irish, lots of languages, children' S language always seems to display 
greater freedom of word order than the adult language, and now we have an 
automatic ex~lanantion for that without having to make up some other kind 
of story. Ianthi Tsimpli's recentl~ completed London PhD thesis6 is an elegant 
demonstration of these points. 
Q: You are saying that research in jrst language acquisitionfiom a generative 
perspective (pecz$cally within the principies and parameters frdmework) is valid 
and desirable. 
Ii other work in jrst language acquisition we$l? 
N.S.: 1 think we' re now back to the dichotomy we went into before with 
regard to theory and description. 1 think that what is lovely about current work 
in first language acquisition is that it really is imbued with a theory which, for 
independent reasons, seems reasonably good and has begun to make predictions 
across a wide enough range for people to: a) take it seriously as a syntactic theory 
or as a general theory of language; and b) to have implications across a really 
wide domain. Now, there's clearly need and room for al1 sorts of studies on first 
. ~ language acquisition in what one might think of as a theory-neutral framework. 
There is the childes database, for instance, and if you want to find out the 
6 .  Tsimpli, Ianthi M. 1992. Functional Categories and Maturation: Tbe Prefinctional Stage ofLanguage 
Acquisition. PhD thesis. University College London. 
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incidence of free word order in Catalan, for example, you can look it up to see 
if there are any studies in the language. If so they can be encoded and that 
information can be accessed and used for further interpretation. But if one 
wants explanation then one has to go beyond this. 1 don't know of any other 
theory of first language acquisition that is remotely plausible or that has 
anything like these results. Now, ofcourse, that doesn't mean there is agreement, 
there was radical disagreement at the Boston Conference7 a few months ago. 
There were almost stand up fights between those who thought functional 
categories were available from the beginning and those who swore that func- 
tional categories matured later on. Nonetheless, there are empirical issues 
bearing on this, and it should be possible to come to a conclusion. But one can 
only ask these questions once one has a theory of functional categories. 1 mean, 
previously people would say things like "children's speech is vaguely telegraphic 
"o? they miss out the function words", but there wasn't a theory of function 
words and nobody knew what function words were. 
Q: Can second language acquisition be usefilfor the studies on jrst language 
acquisition? Are the two processes parallel? 
N.S.: 1 think they can be. And 1 think it is a matter of theoretical 
disagreement at the moment, as to whether the parallels are interesting . The 
position that 1. Tsimpli and 1 developed in the WorkingPaperf recently implies 
that the parallels are not nearly as great as most people think they are. What we 
argued for in that paper was that parameter resetting in L2 is not a possible 
strategy and we did it for various reasons, largely, for instance, because of the 
discontinuities between L1 acquisition and L2 acquisition; that is, L1 acquisi- 
tion appears to be deterministic whereas L2 acquisition clearly isn't , you have 
to work awfully hard and al1 sort of special inputs have to be taken into 
consideration. The "end state", the "steady state" that one ends up with after 
L1 acquisition is pretty uniform, it is close to identical across al1 the members 
of the speech community, indeed across the species, but the "steady state" one 
ends up with in L2 acquisition is clearly not uniform in the same way and is 
not usually remotely as perfect. That suggested to us that it would be an 
interesting hypothesis to suggest that, whereas L1 acquisition is correctly 
characterised in terms of parameter setting - where parameters in the version 
we're interested in are associated with lexical items rather than with principles 
of UG as they used to be for Chomsky - with L2 acquisition, parameter setting 
is no longer an option; that is, you can't reset parameters, al1 you can do is still 
7. The Sixteenth Annuai Boston University Conference on Language Development. October 18-20, 
1991. 
8. Tsimpli, Ianthi and Neil Smith ,1991. "Second Language Learning: Evidence From a Polyglot 
Savant". University College Working Papers in Linguistics 3. 171 -1 83. 
A talk with Neil Smith Links & Letters 1, 1994 115 
have access to principles of UG but only non- parametrized ones. Then you 
have various other possibilities like errors due to general learning strategies - if 
there are general learning strategies , transfer errors from your first language, 
maybe inductive errors of one kind or another ,etc. Now, if that position is 
right - and there's a huge literature saying that what goes on in L2 acquisition 
is precisely parameter resetting -, but if they're al1 wrong and if we are right, 
then L2 acquisition can't say nearly as much about L1 acquisition as it could 
in the other system, simply because by hypothesis now - and hopefully by 
argument as well- the parallels are not nearly as great as they were supposed to be. 
Q: Which data do you work on to test your hypotheses? 
N.S.: We've looked at various bits of data. The nicest data that we've looked 
at recently is work with an " idiot savant", a man called Christopher (C) . This 
is a man who is institutionalized because he is mentally retarded such that on 
non-verbal I Q  tests, he scores between 40 and 75. He's unable to cut his nails, 
he cannot indulge in normal social interaction, he's awkward, he loses his way 
when he goes from place to place. When he came and stayed in my home for 
two days, even at the end he was still puzzled as to how to get upstairs. But he 
can speak 20 languages, with varying degrees of fluency. He knows English, 
French, German, Spanish, Italian, Dutch, Modern Greek, and some Hindi 
reasonably well, and then another dozen languages like Welsh, Turkish, Finnish, 
Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Polish and Russian not quite so well. As part of 
our investigation of this man, we've been teaching him two new languages ( 
Berber and an invented language) under controlled conditions, so that we can 
control the input. The original idea when I thought of doing this was : wouldnt 
it be nice if he were really learning these languages as though they were first 
languages? And that when you therefore set a parameter you might get some 
kind of parametric cascade and you could see what parameters were related to 
what particular sets of phenomena, and we could have answers to al1 these 
questions such as "1s the pro-drop parameter" one parameter or two parameters, 
because of inversion problems and so on? 
Q: So when you started working on this, you thought that there were more 
parallels? 
N.S.: At that time, when we were setting this up, 1 thought there were far 
more parallels than there turned out to be, but then when we started teaching 
C two languages it transpired that the kind of mistakes he was making in these 
- and in fact in other languages especially in Modern Greek, which we've looked 
at in great detail, but also French, German, Spanish and Italian - were typic+ly 
characteristic of L2 learners. They were not the kind of mistakes typically 
characteristic of L1 learners, so you get transfer errors al1 the time, you get 
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general learning strategies, you get analogies of a kind you dont find in L1 
acquisition. That gradually persuaded us - maybe the others didn't need 
persuading, 1 needed persuading - that L2 acquisition was different in kind to 
L1 acquisition, at least for the majority of people - there's a residue of very 
, . 
skillfui expert L2 learners who may retain sime;hing of their L1 ability, but 1 
doubt it, 1 mean, Christopher is extremely good at learning languages and we 
had an example this week. O n  Friday, Ianthi and 1 went to see Christopher, 
who lives in the North of England, with a Dutch woman who is representing 
Dutch television - because theywant us to talk on Dutch television next month. 
Now, Christopher knew a little bit of Dutch and we got him to translate a 
passage a long time ago, which indicated that he had some rudimentary 
knowledge, but it wasn't particularly good. O n  Wednesday of last week, the 
director of the institute where he lives gave him two days off work and a copy 
of Tedch YourselfDutch. He spent the intervening time just reading it and going 
through al1 the exercises and so when we arrived he was able to converse in 
reasoiably fluent Dutch. It had al1 sorts of mistakes, but it was remarkable a) 
that someone with his mental problems could concentrate to that extent, and 
b) that he could absorb the material so fast. He clearly does have a phenomenal 
ability to absorb vocabulary items. But when you look at the syntax, his 
syntactic errors are nearlyall transfer errors from L1, his English mother tongue, 
or they are general inductive generalizations of a kind that one would expect 
in any L2 learner, rather than the kinds of mistakes that little children make. 
For instance, in learning Berber he adopted a general strategy to put al1 clitics 
after the verb, whereas in fact in Berber clitics quite often are in second position, 
if there is a focus marker or a future maker or negation, and in any of those 
situations, the clitic is attracted and climbs to the superordinate functional 
category. Now, although he'd had lots of examples of these, he didn't induce 
that generalization, he induced a generalization which happened to be false, 
but which was very sensible: namely, "clitic goes after the verb". 1 don't know 
of any L1 acquisition data for Berber syntax but that is not a typical kind of 
child mistalte. So we think that there is evidence that L2 acquisition is different 
in kind to L1 acquisition and certainly there is evidence from Christopher. 1. 
Tsimpli and A. Roussou have got a paper in our Working Papers indicating the 
same conclusion from experiments carried out on adult speakers of Greek 
learning English as their second language. So, again, there is converging 
evidence that parameter resetting doesn' t take place. So, that's a long-winded 
way of saying that the parallels between the two are not nearly as close as we 
might like, but, obviously, ifyou are going to characterise the notion of transfer 
error even, then you need to have a theory of what the grammar is so that you 
know what a transfer error could be. So you can still get evidence for the theory 
9. Tsimpli, Ianthi and Anna Roussou.1991. "Parameter Resetting in L2?" Uniuersity College Working 
Papers in Linguistics 3.149-170. 
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of grammar from L2 acquisition and you can still get evidence or useful insights 
into how you might structure L2 instruction. 
Q: Having talked about all these dzfferent areas, do yoti envisage ageneral theo y 
of language compatible with the generative approach to grammar on the basis of 
existing theories? 
N.S.: What 1 think is significant in a number of recent developments is the 
way that at least three different strands have come together. The three strands 
that appear to me as being most important are: the work in generative grammar 
- especially the syntax of Chomsky, and in fact one can think of the whole of 
generative grammar including phonology as being uniform in this respect, 
despite what people like Halle and BrombergerIo say; the second strand is the 
work ofsperber and Wilsonl'in pragmatics which is one of the most significant 
developments in areas peripheral to core grammar of the past ten years - . It 
represents the growth of a fully explicit and sophisticated theory of pragmatics, 
the theory of utterance interpretation, and 1 think Sperber and Wilson's 
Relevance theoy has now enabled us to redraw the lines of demarcation in a 
number of areas so that we no longer try falsely to give syntactic explanations 
for facts that are not syntactic but are semantic, as happened in the sixties. Now 
we've discovered that we can give explanations which are actually pragmatic 
rather even than semantic, and some of my own work has been devoted to 
demonstrating that you can indeed provide pragmatic explanations for pheno- 
mena which simplify the syntax or the semantics. One particular area that I've 
looked at with my son is on the analysis of c~nditionals'~. There are traditional 
problems in the semantics of conditionals, in particular in the so-called 
paradoxes of material implication. One of the things we tried to show was that 
those paradoxes dissolve once you have a pragmatic input rather than simply a 
semantic or syntactic one. Now, that pragmatic analysis is totally or largely 
. parasitic on the existente of a generative grammar of a Chomskyan kind, but 
what we want to do is say that certain phenomena of language ought not to be 
handled by a generative grarnmar, not even a generative grammar that includes 
a leve1 of LF where you have particular logical or quantificational statements, 
but that some phenomena of language will fa11 out from a theory of pragmatics, 
a theory of utterance interpretation rather than a theory of utterance meaning. 
10. Bromberger, Sylvain and Morris Halle.1989. "Why Phonology is Different". Linguistic Inquiry 
20. 51-70. 
- .  
11. See note 2 and the article by Sperber and Wilson in this volume. 
12. Smith, Neil and Amahl Smith ,1988. "A Relevance Theoretic Account of Conditionals". Hyman, 
L. & C. Li (eds.) Language, Speech andMind: Studies in Honourof VtctoriaA. Fromkin, pp. 322-352. 
London: Routledge. 
118 Links & Letters 1, 1994 Mireia Llinhs Grau 
1 said that there were three strands: there's the Chomskyan strand for 
grammar, there's the Sperber-Wilson strand for pragmatics, and utterance 
interpretation, but 1 think that overarching those is the work of Jerry Fodor. In 
a number of seminal books he's developed a position which is, 1 think, best 
summed up in his 1983 book The Modularity ofMind, where what he wants 
to say is that human cognition falls into two camps, if you like. O n  the one 
hand there's the central system which performs an integrating function and 
deals mainly with what one might think of as the fixation of belief - how we 
know what we know and how we come to know what we know - and that 
central system is served by a number of input systems - systems for vision, for 
audition, one corresponding to each of the senses- . In addition there's one 
further input system for Fodor, language is an input system so each of these 
systems serves as input to the central system, say, ifyou like, to provide the grist 
for the central mil1 to grind. One of his major contributions is to point out 
that input systems - both vision and language - have a number of properties in 
common: they work extremely fast, they are mandatory - you can't refuse to 
understand something in your own language just as you can't refuse to see that 
picture there, or a cow, or whatever- . Most importantly, they are informatio- 
nally encapsulated. This means that the fact that you have knowledge of a 
particular kind stored in your central system has no effect on the immediate 
workings of the input system. The obvious example is visual illusions like the 
Müller-Lyer illusion. You have two lines of identical length but with arrow 
heads at each end pointing in and pointing out, and the one with the arrow 
heads pointing out looks longer than the one with the arrow heads pointing 
in. You can measure them so that you know they're the same length, but you 
look at it and it still looks as though one of them is longer than the other. ThatS 
the essence of informational encapsulation in that your real knowldege has no 
effect on your visual perception. Similarly, even if you're primed by the context 
so that you're talking about spiders, if you hear the word "bug", momentarily 
you access both the word "bug" meaning something like a spider but aiso the 
word "bug" meaning "electronic bugging device". Dave Swinney has done 
some interesting experiments on this, pointing out that for a few centi-seconds 
you actually have both of these meanings available. Again, you have informa- 
rionai encapsulation in the language system. Now, it seem to me that why this 
fits together and why itS relevant is that Fodor provides an overall theory of 
human cognition divided into a central system and input systems, which makes 
sense of a wide range of phenomena including some phenomena of visual 
perception, auditory perception and so on. If he is right that language is like 
an input system - which Chomsky actually disagrees with but not in, 1 think, 
very radical ways- , then you have language as an input system, and language 
has been best characterized by Chomsky's work. So you have the theory of 
language - you can take Chomsky's theory - and plug it in to Fodor's model. 
When it comes to vision, you can take David Marr's theory. Sperber and Wilson 
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fit in in the following way: for Fodor the input systems are amenable to 
investigation and we can have interesting theories about them and we can study 
them. But he says, basically, that the central system is impossible to study. We 
have no access to the central system, and he's very pessimistic about it and says 
in general, the greater the abstractness of the system the less likely we are to say 
anything about it. But it seems that Sperber and Wilson's work is precisely a 
theory of the central system. Sperber and Wilson's work is not just a theory of 
utterance interpretation, it's a theory of cognition, of the central system, and 
the "theory of relevance" applies not just to verbal interpretation but also to 
interpretation of visual stimuli and everything else as well. So if you take the 
three strands together, you've got Fodor providing some kind of general theory 
of mind - with input systems which are modular, and the central system -; 
you've got Chomsky providing probably the most insightful and best analysis 
of any human cognitive endeavour this century - and Chomsky's theory is itself 
modular, so that you've got little modules inside the module of language -; and 
to complement that you've got Sperber and Wilson providing an initial attempt 
to give some sort of characterisation of the central system itself in terms of 
relevance. So 1 see those as ultimately leading to an overview of human 
cognition which includes language as a special case. This means that we can 
have a general theory of language, but only now. You know, 30 years ago, 
Chomsky talked about competence and performance, and he developed a 
theory of competence, and we are now getting a theory of performance and 
seeing how both of them fit into a theory of human cognition generally. 
Q: Sinceyou've already talked aboutsyntax andprapatics and how they've been 
developed, why don? you tell us aboutphonology? What do you think thepresent 
state of the theory ofphonology ir? 
N.S.: 1 think phonology is currently polarized. 1 feel that The Sound Pattern 
of English (SPE) is still an overwhelming landmark and it's still important. 
When 1 wrote The Acquisition of Phonology (CUP 1973), it was straight SPE 
type phonology. Now, in syntax since then there's been a radical change because 
of the development of principles and parameters. The people who invented 
generative phonology, Chomsky and Halle, have really continued with it, 
Chomsky's given up phonology he says quite categorically, he took a policy 
decision because he didn't have time for that and for politics. Halle has kept on 
and has published a great deal, much of it very interesting, very seminal, over 
the years, but a couple of years ago he and Bromberger13 - 1 mentioned this in 
passing a while ago - published a paper called "Why Phonology is Different", 
which 1 think is a counter-revolutionary tract attempting to demonstrate that 
13. See note 9. 
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the sorts of arguments that led people to develop principles and pararneters in 
syntax don't carry over to phonology, and that phonology still has to use the 
same kind of old - fashioned machinery that it did in the 1960's , things like 
rule ordering. It seems to me that rule-ordering in particular, which they 
concentrate on, to some extent, is a priori a disaster. If you have a system with 
rule - ordering it's unlearnable. And given the interest in language acquisition 
then it seems to me a disaster ifyou say that your theory requires rule-ordering. 
On the other hand, there are people in phonology, in particular in what's called 
"government phonology" associated with Kaye, Lowenstram and Vergnaud14, 
who think that the principles and parameters paradigm carries over to phono- 
logy. Their work seems to me on exactly the right lines, even though it's still 
extremely sketchy, a lot of it ill-thought out, very minimal in the actual factual 
discoveries or insights it's come up with. But the general meta-theory seems to 
me to be exactly in the right direction. Now, that dichotomy is not always 
perceived in the way it is because al1 phonology - even the sort of stuff in the 
mainstream developing from SPE - has changed fairly radically and it's changed 
1 think in particular in maybe three ways. One is that the unilinearity of SPE 
has now given way to multinearity or non-linearity and so we have autoseg- 
mental phonology where you have a number of different tiers of representation 
taking place simultaneously. Whereas in SPE you would have a sequence of 
segments where the vowels would be specified for both tongue height and pitch 
height, nowadays you have two quite independent autosegmental tiers where 
you have segmental properties on one tier and tonal properties on another tier, 
and the arguments for this seem to be ovenvhelming, 1 think everyone has 
accepted them, and it's a radical change from when 1 was working on The 
Acquisition ofPhonology (N) for instance. Similarly, everybody now, 1 think, 
accepts that you need some kind of hierarchical structure. That really came in 
with metrical phonology and again when 1 did the AP 1 made various remarks 
about the need for the syllable and how it would be nice if we had some kind 
of construct of that kind. In SPE there was no syllable, there was just the feature 
[ syllabic]. But nowadays everybody has hierarchical structure and metrical 
phonology has developed it most. Similarly, everybody prettywell now acknow- 
ledges the importance of the lexicon so lexical phonology has taken it to its 
natural extreme, but al1 current theories of phonology embody claims about 
the role of the lexicon and usually divide their phonological statements into 
those that take place in the lexicon and those that don't. So those are three fairly 
radical departures al1 of which really characterise everyone working in current 
phonology. The things that really keep them apart are things like the nature of 
the primitives, whether it's elements or distinctive features - which strikes me 
14. Kaye, Jonathan, Jean Lowenstram and Jean-Roger Vergnaud.1990. "Constituent Structure and 
Government in Phonology". Phonology 7. 193-23 1. 
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as not particularly important - , the question of rule-ordering - which strikes 
me as VERY important for language acquisition reasons -, but most of al1 the 
status of rules as opposed to principles. Al1 the other kinds of phonology except 
government phonology still tend to be preoccupied with rules. Rules for 
Chomsky, for instance in syntax, are now purely epiphenomenal, they have no 
primitive status, it's only the principles and the individual lexical entries that 
,. have real ontological status in the grammar. ThatS the case also for Kaye et al's 
"government phonology", they don't want rules any more either, if you have a 
rule it must be wrong. They want principles and the instantiation of those 
principles in particular geometrically defined sequences will give you al1 the 
output you want, and therefore they don't have to postulate individual rules. 
That seems to me to be the direction that we ought to go in. But very little 
progress has been made yet which is why it's not widely known except in 
London, and not particularly popular but it seems that that's the way things 
ought to go, and to adopt the kind ofstrategy that mainstrearn post-SPE people 
do -1ike the Bromberger and Halle paper 1 mentioned - seems to me theoreti- 
cally undesirable a priori. 
